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Abstract: In this paper I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of 
shame, it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic 
multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by 
Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno and Fabrice 
Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of 
shame and embarrassment that connects both emotions to ‘whole-self’ 
properties. Shame and embarrassment, I claim, are products of the same 
underlying emotion. I distinguish between moralized and non-moralized shame 
in order to show when, and how, moral and non-moral shame may be justly 
deployed. Shame is appropriate, I argue, if and only if it targets malleable moral 
or non-moral normative imperfections of a person’s ‘whole-self.’ Shame is 
unjustifiable when it targets durable aspects of a person’s ‘whole-self.’ I 
conclude by distinguishing shame punishments from guilt punishments and 
show that my account can explain why it is wrong to shame individuals on 
account of their race, sex, gender, or body while permitting us to sometimes 
levy shame and shame punishment against others, even those otherwise 
immune to moral reasons.  
Keywords: Calhoun, embarrassment, gender, mental illness, race, 
responsibility, shame. 
 
Shame and embarrassment are almost always unpleasant to feel. They belong to 
a family of ‘self-conscious’ emotions that include pride and guilt and which are 
closely associated with self-esteem and self-worth. Additionally, because of the 
social nature of shame and embarrassment, it can be difficult for us to fully 
extinguish these feelings. Furthermore, because shame and, to a lesser extent, 
embarrassment appear to focus on who we are (as opposed to what we have 
done), some philosophers have argued that these emotions do not have a place 
in a liberal pluralistic society (Nussbaum 2004). In this paper I make appeal to 
empirical work on shame and embarrassment to argue that shame and shaming 
can be justly deployed in pluralistic multicultural societies. Beyond the informal 
use of shame, I offer a conditional defense of state-issued shaming punishment 
on the basis of my account of shame.  
First, I argue that empirical work on shame and embarrassment should 
lead us to see both as different ways of expressing the same underlying 
emotional process. This view diverges from recent philosophical analyses of 
shame and embarrassment that draw a sharp boundary between these emotions. 
I argue that we have good reason for unifying these feelings and rejecting other 
accounts. The distinguishing features of shame and embarrassment will be 
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shown to depend upon how the person feeling the emotion conceptualizes the 
situation she finds herself in. Whether the emotion is called shame or 
embarrassment expresses something about the relationship between the agent 
and how she perceives the judgments that others make of what I will call her 
‘whole-self’ properties.  
I then put this account of shame and embarrassment into practice. I offer a 
conditional defense of shaming and shame punishment in the context of a 
pluralistic society. Although recent defenses of shame have focused on a 
distinctly moralized conception of the emotion (Calhoun 2004), I argue that 
shame can be appropriate not only against moralized character flaws but also 
against non-moral normative failings. Though I believe that shame has these 
uses, we must be careful, I suggest, to avoid shaming individuals for aspects of 
their selves that are either not easily malleable or about which reasonable 
evaluative disagreement is possible. 
Shame: Recent Accounts 
Shame has many critics. Some have argued that shame is always inappropriate 
because it is fundamentally degrading (Nussbaum 2004). Others worry that a 
society in which shaming is sanctioned will be subject to the tyranny of the 
moral majority or in which shame-based violence is used to violate the rights 
and dignity of citizens (Hall 2013). Even if we grant that the politics of shame 
requires reformation (and it does!), I will work from the assumption that shame, 
and indeed all our negative emotions, can have value (D’arms and Jacobson 
2000). Reformation, not abolition, is what is needed (Arneson 2007).  
Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni (2012), hereafter 
DRT, have recently proposed a new account, and defense, of shame. On DRT’s 
view, shame is defined in terms of the judgments that an individual makes about 
her values, her actions, and her character. On their view, shame is subjectively 
determined in a relatively extreme way by these judgments. Although social 
factors may play a causal role on their account of shame, the thoughts, judgments, 
or beliefs of others are neither necessary nor sufficient for the emotion. 
Additionally, although DRT attempt to distinguish shame from an emotion they 
call ‘humiliation,’ this account is impoverished. They do not explore the 
relationships between shame and anger (which they blend together in their 
account of humiliation) that would help to better distinguish embarrassment 
from humiliation. In these respects, their account of shame fails to capture 
important social and normative aspects of shame.  
Second, Cheshire Calhoun (2004) has produced what may be the best 
known defense of shame in the recent literature. Unlike DRT’s (2012) account, 
Calhoun rejects purely subjective explanations of the determinants of shame. 
Calhoun sees shame as an emotion that emerges when we are judged by others 
with whom we are co-participants in a normative framework. Shame, on her 
view, requires the existence of others (and their judgments) in order to function.  
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According to Calhoun, “[m]oral criticism has practical weight when we see 
it as issuing from those who are to be taken seriously because they are co-
participants with us in some shared social practice of morality” (Calhoun 2004, 
139). Because we are co-participants, and because co-participation is always 
aimed at shared activities (moral, academic, or other practice) co-participants 
must develop and exist within the context of shared social norms. Thus, on 
Calhoun’s account, even if we reject a co-participant’s judgment about us, we 
remain shamed on her account because these judgments retain pragmatic social 
significance for us: “[s]haming criticisms work by impressing upon the person 
that she has disappointed not just one individual’s expectations but what some 
‘we’ expected from her” (Calhoun 2004, 140). One difficult question arising from 
such an analysis is who our co-participants are. Many of our shared normative 
institutions include hundreds of millions of others (in the case of national and 
global institutions). Notwithstanding this question, Calhoun’s view has several 
advantages over DRT’s account. 
First, Calhoun’s view takes seriously the social elements of shame and 
shaming. DRT go to great lengths to deny that shame has this essentially social 
dimension. Calhoun is right, I argue, to reject this claim. The judgments of real or 
imagined others are essential for shame and shaming to take place. Without 
reference to the judgments of real or imagined others, DRT’s account of shame 
turns shame into a form of guilt over one’s character traits.1  
Calhoun’s account also has another, less appreciated, advantage over 
DRT’s more recent theory: it takes seriously the fact that shame can be 
experienced even when it goes against one’s considered judgment or values. 
Because Calhoun’s view of shame is grounded on the judgments of our co-
participants, it is clear how those judgments could differ from our own. In other 
words, Calhoun’s account can explain why an immigrant may feel ashamed about 
his legal status even if he consciously judges that there is nothing to be ashamed 
of. It can explain why a person may feel ashamed about their sexual identity and 
preferences even if they think that they should reject the values that govern this 
shame. This kind of shame is neither an aberration nor is it rare. That DRT do not 
allow for its existence is a significant drawback of their view. Worse, because 
DRT make shame an emotion tied to an individual’s consciously held judgments 
and values they would need to claim that these individuals consciously believe 
                                                        
1 Guilt is traditionally defined as an emotion that is subjectively determined (i.e., only the 
guilty party can trigger guilt feelings). These feelings arise from judging that something we 
have done was morally wrong. In this sense, guilt is focused on the moral wrongness of our 
actions and only our judgment can trigger the feeling. That others believe I acted wrongly has 
no bearing on whether I feel guilty so long as I think what I have done is permissible. Shame, 
on the other hand, focuses not on the wrongness of our actions but instead on more global 
judgments about our whole selves. We feel guilt for what we have done but we are ashamed of 
ourselves.  
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that they ought to feel ashamed in order to explain this shame. This is an 
unpalatable account of these forms of shame.  
Although Calhoun’s view has these advantages, I argue that it too should 
be rejected. I do this for two reasons. First, Calhoun’s account of shame, like 
DRT’s, makes it difficult to differentiate shame from embarrassment. Although 
both Calhoun and DRT distinguish shame from guilt, Calhoun does not clearly 
distinguish shame from embarrassment. This is a mistake for reasons that will 
become clear later. Although DRT distinguish shame from humiliation, their 
account of humiliation fails to capture the essence of embarrassment (and, 
indeed, cannot explain why we are sometimes embarrassed, but not humiliated, 
by positive attention).2  
Additionally, both Calhoun and DRT neglect relevant empirical data on 
implicit bias, dual systems heuristics, and recalcitrant emotion that can help us 
make better sense of shame. Calhoun and DRT offer opposed, but polarized, 
theories of the role of subjectivity when it comes to shame. DRT assert that 
shame is entirely dependent on an individual agent’s subjective values and 
judgments. It is impossible for others to shame me, on their account, unless I 
judge that I have failed to live up to values that I myself endorse (more 
accurately, when I judge that I have not only failed to live up to my values but 
have instead acted in a way that I judge to be antithetical to my values). This 
view places too much responsibility on an agent for her own shame (and 
provides an unpalatable account of shame as it relates to gender, race, and sexual 
identity).  
Calhoun, on other hand, moves too far in the opposite direction. On her 
view we are subjects of shame whenever anyone with whom we are co-
participants in a normative enterprise judges us negatively. Given the large scale 
of contemporary normative enterprises, Calhoun’s view allows for situations 
that appear to elicit not shame but anger instead. It is at this point that better 
theories of shame, embarrassment, and anger can help us to make sense of this 
landscape and better explain when shame and shaming could be justifiable. 
Shame, Embarrassment, Humiliation, and Anger 
Although many theories of shame and embarrassment can be found in the 
psychological and philosophical literature (Keltner and Buswell 1997; Maibom 
2010; Tagney and Miller 1996; Taylor 1985; Williams 1986/2006), I focus on the 
particularly promising account of shame and embarrassment that emerges from 
research conducted by John Sabini and his colleagues. On Sabini’s view (Sabini 
                                                        
2 Interestingly, DRT approvingly cite Sabini’s work in the context of discussing embarrassment 
(2012, 117). This is odd given Sabini’s rejection of a bright line between shame and 
embarrassment, something DRT go to great lengths to argue for. It’s not clear why DRT think it 
possible to accept Sabini’s work on embarrassment without undermining their major thesis 
about the nature of shame.  
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and Silver 1997; Sabini, Garvey, and Hall 2001) shame and embarrassment are 
two faces of the same underlying affective process. They are not distinct 
emotions but instead represent different ways of framing the same emotion. 
These different frames carry contrasting expressive messages about the feeler’s 
appraisals (conscious or unconscious) about the situation that elicited the feeling.  
Why should we think that shame and embarrassment represent different 
faces of the same emotion? On the one hand, we lack good evidence for uniquely 
distinguishing them. Shame and embarrassment cannot be distinguished via 
reference to unique patterns of bodily changes nor can they be distinguished by 
looking at patterns of neurological activation (Sabini et al. 2000; Sabini, Garvey, 
and Hall 2001). Additionally, Sabini and his colleagues argue that shame and 
embarrassment cannot be distinguished from one another in terms of their 
severity (shame is not necessarily a more severe or intense version of 
embarrassment), nor can the two feelings be distinguished by their 
characteristic objects (both shame and embarrassment target what are called 
‘whole-self’ properties). Lastly, the failure to find distinct neurological or 
physiological markers for shame and embarrassment is not a unique 
phenomenon. Most emotions lack these features (Barrett 2006; Gendron, 
Roberson, and Barrett 2015).  
Lacking mind-independent unifying characteristics, Sabini and colleagues 
argue that shame and embarrassment are products of the same underlying 
affective process. This process is triggered whenever real or imagined others are 
in a position to judge one or more of our ‘whole-self’ properties. Whole-self 
properties are features of a person’s identity that may manifest in action but 
which are present even when not immediately acted upon: character traits, 
racial traits, gender and sexual identities, and the like represent some of our 
whole-self properties. According to Sabini:  
When someone makes the appraisal that something has happened that might 
be taken as evidence that his or herself has been discredited, an emotional state 
is triggered. That painful, inhibiting state, one that leads one to want to become 
small and hide, might be called “State A.” If the person is later asked (or for 
some other reason chooses) to describe that state, if the person wishes to imply 
that he or she sees the revealed flaw as real, then he or she will call it shame. 
However, if he or she wishes not to license the inference that he or she believes 
a real flaw of the self was revealed, then he or she will call it embarrassment. 
(Sabini et al. 2000)  
Any scenario where one or more of our whole-self properties is judged by 
real or imagined others is therefore an occasion for what Sabini calls ‘State A.’ 
Conceptualization, on this view, plays a key role in the differentiation of shame 
from embarrassment. We call the state shame as an indication that the negative 
evaluation of the whole-self property is true. We call the state embarrassment as 
a way of acknowledging that, although the situation appears to license the 
judgments that others are making of us, we don’t really think we have the whole-
self property in question.  
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For example, accidentally bumping into someone seems like a cause for 
embarrassment. This is because, in calling the emotion embarrassment, I 
acknowledge that it appears that I am clumsy or uncaring about personal spaces 
(both are relevant whole-self properties that may be up for judgment). However, 
I also, in saying that I am embarrassed, indicate that I think I actually do care 
about the personal spaces of others and that the fact that I bumped into you 
shouldn’t lead you to think that I lack respect for your space. This way of 
thinking about embarrassment also helps us make sense of the seemingly 
puzzling instances of feeling embarrassed by positive judgments of our whole-
self properties.  
Feeling embarrassed by a compliment, in this instance, expresses the same 
message as embarrassment in other contexts: “although I grant that it may seem 
like I’m x, I don’t really think I am x.” DRT’s conception of humiliation does not 
capture this phenomenon. On their view, humilation necessarily requires a form 
of unjust public attack on our person. Embarrassment does not require such an 
injustice. Sabini’s conception of shame and embarrassment, however, does make 
room for a form of anger that derives from ‘State A’ experiences that captures 
DRT’s sense of humiliation as well.  
On the view I am proposing, shame is a way of acknowledging an 
acceptance (conscious or not) of the real or imagined judgments of others.3 
Embarrassment is a way of acknowledging that, while a situation appears to 
justify an inference about our whole-self, we reject the judgment the situation 
appears to license. This leaves a space open for situations in which real or 
imagined others judge a whole-self property of ours and where we believe that 
those judgments are not at all licensed by the situation. For example, suppose a 
colleague calls me lazy despite significant evidence to the contrary. In such cases, 
Sabini claims, the emotion I am likely to feel is neither shame nor 
embarrassment (nor humiliation) but rather, I will feel anger. This account 
functions better both descriptively and normatively. Anger, not humiliation, is 
the right response to baseless judgments about our character.  
As I have argued, Calhoun’s account, while possessing advantages over 
DRT’s view, does not match up to the picture of shame that emerges from the 
empirical literature. Calhoun is motivated to defend her account of shame, in 
part, out of a wider rejection of traditional conceptions of autonomy that fail to 
appreciate how autonomy can be socially constructed. This appreciation of the 
social dimension thus leads her to view shame not only as socially constructed in 
a shallow sense (i.e., that shame requires a social world and that this social world 
defines the sorts of exchanges that make shame possible for us) but in a much 
deeper sense. Shame is constructed, on her view, without input on the part of the 
                                                        
3 Unconscious appraisals (discussed below), allow appraisal theories like Sabini’s to make 
room for the effects of internalized norms not present in consciousness.  
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agent who is an object of shame (her judgments are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for shaming).  
On Calhoun’s view, the judgment of co-participants ought to trigger shame 
even when we believe that they lack any grounding. This seems wrong on both 
empirical and normative fronts. First, it does not appear that subjects in 
situations like these actually do tend to feel ashamed (Sabini, Garvey, and Hall 
2001). Second, shame would be the wrong response to a groundless judgment 
about our whole-self properties. It is understandable why some might think that 
I am uncaring if I arrive late (through no fault of my own) to the department 
meeting, and hence why such a situation may be embarrassing. However, given 
no evidence at all for such a judgment (I have always been to meetings on time, 
go above and beyond with my teaching and service, etc.,), being called uncaring 
in such circumstances, even by those with whom I am co-participants in a 
normative framework, calls for anger, not shame.  
Acceptance of this view of embarrassment and shame need not imply, as 
Calhoun seems to claim, that we lose track of the essentially social aspects of 
these emotions. Both shame and embarrassment make sense only in the context 
of social spaces. For example, suppose that you are in the grocery store and I 
accidentally knock over a display of paper rolls which now begin to cascade onto 
the floor. This was an accident, of course, though the (real or imagined) gaze of 
others demands a response from me.  
In a series of now classic studies, Semin and Manstead (1982) showed 
subjects a series of video clips of exactly the sort of scenario described. They 
argued that in a case like this “embarrassment displays can be construed as non-
verbal apologies for social transgressions” (Semin and Manstead 1982, 369). 
Semin and Manstead furthermore found that individuals made less severe 
judgments about someone who knocked over a store display who then appeared 
embarrassed relative to those who were not embarrassed (1982). Sabini’s 
research on shame and embarrassment can help us make sense of how all of this 
can be the case. Embarrassment signals a recognition, on the part of the 
embarrassed agent, that the situation appears to license a judgment about one or 
more of her whole-self properties. Furthermore, it signals that the embarrassed 
agent rejects this judgment about her properties. In doing this, she joins her 
audience in condemning the whole-self property that is apparently on display 
while, simultaneously, signalling that she does not actually possess the property 
in question. The social dimension is therefore an essential feature of any 
explanation of ‘State-A’ emotions.  
Sabini’s view provides a better account of the relationship between shame, 
embarrassment, and anger than prior accounts. However, it also has the 
resources to better explain the phenomena of ‘recalcitrant’ emotions. An 
emotion is recalcitrant when we continue to feel it despite our judgment that the 
feeling is unwarranted (D’arms and Jacobson 2003). Survivor’s guilt, for example, 
is often felt by individuals even though they (rightly) believe that they have done 
Erick Jose Ramirez 
84 
nothing wrong. All emotions have the ability to manifest as recalcitrant. Because 
DRT’s view of shame requires that agents consciously judge that their actions 
flout their intentionally held values in order for shame to manifest, it carries the 
consequence that shame cannot be recalcitrant. Given the widely experienced 
nature of emotional recalcitrance, this is a significant cost of DRT’s view.  
Although Calhoun’s view allows for a kind of recalcitrance, I argue that 
Sabini’s view has the resources to provide a better explanation. Because 
Calhoun’s view of shame allows for the judgements of others, all on their own, to 
shame an individual, it is possible for an individual to feel ashamed despite her 
own opposition. As previously noted, many of these situations would seem to 
elicit anger and not shame. Additionally, by ignoring the shamed agent, Calhoun 
provides an impoverished account of how recalcitrance can arise in us.  
Sabini’s theory of shame and embarrassment is an appraisal theory. In 
other words, subjects must conceptualize (i.e., appraise) their situation in the 
right way in order to feel certain emotions. These conceptualizations, 
importantly, need not be conscious. Many appraisals happen at the subdoxastic 
level. Dual process theories of judgment and decision making (Stanovich and 
West 2000; Kahneman 2003) for example, help to explain how subjects can feel 
ashamed by aspects of their whole-selves as a result of internalized implicit 
biases that run counter to their explicitly chosen conscious values.  
Tension between implicit, internalized, norms and explicit, consciously 
held values better explains the phenomena of recalcitrant shame. Internalizing 
anti-immigrant norms, for example, may explain why someone may feel 
ashamed of being an undocumented immigrant even though they believe that 
open immigration policies are just. This explanation maintains contact with the 
individual feeling shame, unlike Calhoun’s view, while keeping the judgments of 
real or imagined others an essential feature of the emotion. I now turn my 
attention to the regulation of what I will call ‘moralized’ and ‘non-moralized’ 
shame in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society.  
The Regulation of Moral and Non-Moral Shame 
I have argued that we should understand shame as an emotion that expresses 
something about the explicitly held or implicitly internalized norms of a speaker 
when one or more of her whole-self properties are judged by others (real or 
imagined). I now wish to distinguish between two different senses of shame that 
I will refer to as moralized and non-moralized shame.  
The objects of shame (and embarrassment) are whole-person properties. 
These properties can manifest themselves in our actions but are not, themselves, 
easily reducible to an action. Although character traits are paradigmatic whole-
person properties (i.e, one can be honest, manipulative, brave, selfish, cruel and 
so on), whole-person properties include features of a whole-self that are not, 
arguably, character/virtue based. For example one may be a good swimmer, a 
bad comedian, a mediocre artist, or an attractive person. Additionally, features of 
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a whole-self include properties relating to racial, sexual, and gender identity 
along with a person’s genetic, cultural, and ethnic heritage. This allows us to 
provide a unifying explanation of shame that connects shame felt about whole-
self properties that vary across many dimensions (character properties, identity 
properties, embodied properties, and historical properties).  
There are important distinctions to note about shame that relate to the 
kind of whole-self property involved. When a person is shamed over a whole-self 
property that represents, in the eyes of the shamer, a moral failing, we can refer 
to this form of shame as moralized shame. Moralized shame targets a feature of a 
person’s whole-self in an attempt to use a subject’s shame to enact their own 
conceptions of moral progress. Moralized shame, in this sense, is defined largely 
in terms of the intentions of the shaming party. This is in contrast to traditional 
accounts of guilt which are largely focused on an individual judging that he has 
acted wrongfully. As a result, it is possible for a committed racist to use race-
shame in a moralized way. Although this form of moralized shaming is wrong, I 
will argue that at least some forms of moralized shame can be justifiably 
deployed in a pluralistic society. My sense of moral, in this application, will 
therefore be limited to moral norms that must be shared in order for pluralistic 
communities to flourish.  
Non-moralized shame can be defined as shame which targets a whole-self 
property for a non-moral failure. Non-moral shame is still normative, and this 
normativity will play an important role in my defense of non-moral shame, but 
this normativity is not essentially moral. For example, one may be ashamed of 
being a bad teacher in a way that does not implicate a clear moral failing.  
We can also mark distinctions grounded on features of the whole-self 
property being targeted by the shamer. As previously noted, some whole-self 
properties are more straightforwardly related to an agent’s actions than others. 
A person can only manifest the whole-self property of ‘being a liar’ or ‘being a 
narcissist’ or ‘being courageous’ if they have a history of acting in ways that 
support the existence of such properties.4  
Other whole-self properties are less clearly connected to an agent’s actions. 
For example, being a member of a certain racial group is explicable largely in 
terms of the social and historical context that an individual is located in and are 
less dependent on an individual’s actions, beliefs, and judgments than other 
whole-self properties that may adhere to us.5 Whole-self properties connected to 
                                                        
4 In marking this distinction, I step into somewhat contentious territory about the nature of 
character traits (Sreenivasan 2013; Doris 2002). Because I focus here on the ethics of shaming, 
it is essential, to my account, that shame is only permissible, in the rare cases where it is 
permissible, only on account of whole-self properties that manifest in behavior.  
5 The construction of race is, of course, much more complicated than I have laid out here. 
Additionally, insofar as race has performative aspects, individual behavior can be a relevant 
(but not determining) feature of one’s racial identity. For example, Mallon (2004) and Appiah 
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action are therefore more malleable than those whole-self properties not so 
easily connected. This distinction is important to keep in mind when discussing 
the permissibility of shaming, especially when enacting shame punishments.  
While it may be difficult to shift from being a liar to someone who is 
honest, it is even more difficult to shift more durable whole-self properties 
(those relating to race and sex are especially durable in this sense). Other 
properties lie somewhere in between these extremes. Bodily whole-self 
properties, for example, are often subject to shame. Though our body shape is 
loosely under our control, the malleability of bodies (especially with regard to 
weight and appearance) is less susceptible to individual action than other more 
straightforwardly character-based whole-self properties. I argue below that this 
fact makes body shaming unjustifiable.  
With these distinctions in mind, I now propose (and defend) both 
moralized and non-moralized shame and, in rare circumstances, even the 
enactment of shame punishments. Moralized and non-moralized shame, in the 
context of a pluralistic society, can be used to effect positive change. Shame is 
permissible, on my view, when it meets the following criteria:  
1. Shame does not target a deeply durable whole-self property: durable 
properties are those non-character based whole-self properties that are 
difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to alter. 
2. Shame does not target features of the whole-self over which reasonable 
pluralistic disagreement exists: a disagreement is reasonable if it is 
possible for parties to the disagreement to live alongside one another 
while maintaining their disagreement. 
The first criterion helps us to see which whole-self properties are proper 
targets for shaming. The second criterion situates shaming in the context of 
pluralism and multiculturalism. One of the many concerns that opponents of 
shame punishment raise is the danger of a tyranny of a moral majority 
(Nussbaum 2008; Hall 2013). Shame can be dangerous if used to force a 
universalist normative ideal on a diverse citizenry. We can help to mitigate the 
problem of a moral mob by appealing to Rawls’ notion of a public reason in the 
context of multicultural and pluralistic nations.6 My defense of shame and 
                                                                                                                                           
(1996) go to great lengths to demonstrate the various ways in which institutional and social 
forces can shape racial categories and racial identity.  
6 My account of reasonableness is indebted to Rawls’ (1996) account of the reasonable citizen. 
In doing so, I do not intend to commit myself fully to Rawlsian political ideology. For example, 
though I appeal to Rawls’ notion of a public reason to define a reasonable disagreement, I use 
it only to discuss the permissibility of shame and, in an even more limited sense, shame 
punishment. I take seriously concerns others have raised that a state that adopts Rawls’ 
principle of public reasons may operate on anti-democratic norms (Benhabib, 2002). I do not 
aim to restrict the content of speech in a pluralistic society. My argument is intended to justify 
the shaming of individuals who hold views that are unreasonable in the thin sense of 
reasonable implied by the notion of a public reason.  
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shaming is conditional: only whole-self properties over which reasonable 
disagreement is impossible are proper targets for shame.  
Examples will be helpful to clarify the criteria. Reasonableness is 
admittedly difficult to define. For my purposes, a commitment to pluralism 
requires the acknowledgement that others may disagree with me about matters 
of value. So long as it is possible for individuals to peaceably live alongside one 
another while maintaining their disagreements, the disagreement is a reasonable 
one. Persons of different religious groups, for example, hold deeply inconsistent 
metaphysical views and/or have conflicting beliefs about value. However, it is 
possible for most parties of religious disagreements to live alongside one 
another provided neither’s beliefs command the conversion or elimination of 
non-believers. This type of disagreement, while deep and longstanding, is 
reasonable. Religious shaming, in these situations, would be inappropriate as the 
change it would effect is inconsistent with value pluralism.  
Contrast this with the conflict that holds between a committed racist of the 
sort who believes that members of other races (as he construes them) are sub-
human. In such a case, it is impossible for members of different races to live 
alongside such a person without radically constraining the liberty of at least one 
of the parties. The disagreement between the racist and his neighbors is 
unreasonable. Racism, in this sense, is defined by a set of beliefs. Even if the 
process of changing these beliefs is difficult, beliefs are malleable. The racist can 
therefore be rightfully shamed in such a scenario and ought to be ashamed of 
himself for his beliefs. The shame, in this circumstance, would ideally function to 
change his whole-self property of ‘being a racist’ to something that fits more 
comfortably in a pluralistic society.7 The same would apply to non-racist political 
ideologies that would qualify as unreasonable in the thin sense I intend here (i.e., 
those that restrict voting rights along gender or class lines). These would also be 
justifiably open to shame and shaming punishments.  
Consider another example: aesthetic whole-self properties. Properties like 
‘being beautiful’, ‘being elegant’ and the like may be durable and thus blocked by 
my first criterion from shaming. However, even if they are not durable, that is, 
even if individuals can exercise some control over their aesthetic whole-self 
properties, I argue that they still form an inappropriate basis for shaming. 
Aesthetic properties will always be subject to reasonable disagreement even 
where culturally dominant models of beauty exist. This is because it is always 
                                                        
7 Success, in this instance, does not mean that we fully convert the racist or remove all of his 
noxious beliefs. All that is needed is to shame the racist into a more reasonable position about 
the humanity of his neighbors so that he may peaceably live alongside them. Though 
moralized shamers may seek to enact even greater change in the racist, this form of shaming 
would run afoul of my second criterion. The moral majority does not have a right to shame 
others into accepting its values so long as evaluative disagreements are reasonable. It’s not 
clear whether any forms of racism would be reasonable in the public reasons sense though at 
least some offensive ways of being would remain.  
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possible for individuals with conflicting aesthetic ideologies to live alongside one 
another. The second criterion, grounded on the notion of reasonable 
disagreement, blocks the imposition of aesthetic mob rule just as much as it 
blocks the rule of the moral majority. The only exceptions to these 
generalizations are aesthetic ideologies that combine with one or more moral 
failings to threaten the existence of shared public spaces.8 
Shame Punishments 
The function of shame is to enact a positive change in whole-self properties that, 
for moral or non-moral reasons, are inconsistent with pluralistic multicultural 
societies. Shame is poised to enact these changes in ways that other reactive 
attitudes, like guilt, are not. Specifically, this is because guilt is typically thought 
to focus on an agent’s actions. That is, an agent must judge that they have done 
something wrong in order to feel guilty. Reparative behaviors related to guilt 
therefore focus on repairing the negative consequences of a bad action. Guilt 
does not, importantly, require that agents consider their whole-self properties 
from which those bad actions issue (Williams 1989/2006). Reparative action 
related to shame, therefore, is focused on changing the whole-self properties that 
an agent is ashamed of. It is not enough to apologize for lying in order to rid 
oneself of the shame of being a liar. One must cease to be a liar. This is the special 
value of shame. When properly deployed, shaming can enact positive change in 
both the shamed person and, as a consequence, provides a benefit to his society 
as well (Arneson, 2007).  
Shame punishments represent punishments whose main aim is to 
encourage a specific form of self-reflection in the hopes of enacting positive 
change in the target’s whole-self; importantly, shame punishments extend 
beyond traditional guilt-based incarceration and often include dialogue between 
the subject of shame punishment and the individuals and/or community 
enacting the punishment (Book 1999). Successful shame punishments change a 
person’s perspective so that he comes to reject the targeted whole-self 
properties and is driven to change them in order to relieve himself of shame. 
Shame punishments can vary though they all share the goal of publicizing that 
the shamed person has the whole-self property for which he is being shamed. 
For example, some shame punishments require that an individual stand in front 
of a courthouse holding a sign identifying their crime or to place a similar sign 
near their home (Book, 1999). 
Before defending shame punishment, I wish to say several things about 
shame and its connection to shame punishment. First, if my earlier argument has 
                                                        
8 In cases like these, shame is appropriate only because the relevant whole-self property poses 
a threat to public spaces and not, purely because it is the subject of aesthetic disagreement. 
Examples are difficult to come by though aesthetized versions of Feinberg’s (1985) bus cases 
may help elucidate the relevant sense of ‘threat to public spaces’ that I have in mind.  
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force, then shame and shaming are sometimes justifiable in the context of a 
multicultural and pluralistic society. To say that shame is justified in this context 
is to say that a person may be shamed in a narrow range of cases (for malleable 
whole-self properties that are not properties over which reasonable 
disagreement is possible). However, it does not tell us who is justified in shaming 
the individual. I argue that the state is best poised to shame individuals for such 
properties. Why is this the case? If shame is left at the purely informal level, 
concerns about mob rule are far more likely to arise. In a minimally just 
pluralistic society, the rule of law would prevent states from enshrining into law 
legislation that would run afoul of my proposed criteria for shaming. As a result, 
state-sanctioned shaming (i.e., shame punishments) is justified if shaming is 
justified.  
We must be cautious in the application of such punishment. Historical 
shame punishments almost all run afoul of my proposed criteria. Many historical 
shame punishments target whole-self properties that are subject to reasonable 
disagreement. Adultery, apostasy, and bigamy, for example, are norms over 
which reasonable disagreement is possible. Shame punishments, historical or 
contemporary, that target these properties are unjustifiable. Secondly, historical 
shame punishments often faltered because they made it impossible to enact 
positive change in the shamed individual by transforming a malleable whole-self 
property into a durable one. For example, although ‘being a thief’ is a whole-self 
property that it may be appropriate to shame someone for, branding an 
individual makes it impossible to change the property and hence is an 
inappropriate form of shaming.9 Lastly, we must be cautious in the forms of 
shaming that we allow. In what follows, I specify the particular constraints that 
should limit the form of shame punishments. 
The infliction of shame, in the limited circumstances I outline here, is 
meant to cause positive change in the individual being shamed. Shame, as I 
defend it, targets malleable whole-self properties that render it impossible for an 
individual to live peaceably alongside his neighbors. Because the removal of 
shame requires the removal the of whole-self property targeted, shaming can 
cause positive change to the individual. Questions about the efficacy of shaming 
in terms of enacting positive changes in a person are partly empirical and in that 
domain the answer appears to be that shaming can effect positive change in a 
person if used correctly. For example, shaming appears to reduce recidivism 
more than traditional guilt-based incarceration (Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez 
2014). Shame, moral or non-moral, must be aimed very specifically only to those 
whole-self properties that we wish to change.  
                                                        
9 In the United States, many states require that any individual convicted of a sex offense list 
themselves in a ‘sex offender registry’ for their lifetime and to update this registry whenever 
they change their home address. This form of shaming may also transform a malleable 
property (‘being a sex offender’) into a durable one and hence may also be an inappropriate 
form of shaming.  
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Shame must not be used to merely reject a whole-agent as a member of 
society. Call such shame disintegrative shame. Such disintegrative shaming, 
insofar as it targets an entire person, unfairly targets durable whole-person 
properties along with those that are subject to reasonable disagreement. 
Disintegrative shaming is ineffective at producing positive character change. For 
example, some have argued that “when individuals are shamed so remorselessly 
and unforgivingly that they become outcasts…it becomes more rewarding [for 
them] to associate with others who are perceived in some limited or total way as 
also at odds with mainstream standards” (Braithwaite 1989, 67). For this reason, 
I favor appealing to what is known as reintegrative shaming in the context of 
shame punishment (Braithwaite 2002; Morris 2002).  
Reintegrative shaming aims to respect the individual while attempting to 
get him to see one of his particular whole-self properties as negative. Insofar as 
shame has a purpose, its purpose should be reintegrative. However, I have 
argued that shaming and shame punishments can be used in several ways. The 
following examples should clarify the extent to which shame, properly 
attenuated, has a place in a pluralistic society.  
Take the following three cases: Alzheimer’s disease, antisocial personality 
disorder, and gender dysphoria. Mental illness is a notoriously difficult and 
multifaceted construction with many critics (Maddux 2001; Wakefield 1992). 
The 400+ list of mental illnesses and disorders classified in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA 2013) notoriously bear little 
relationship with one another in a way that allows for an easy unification of the 
concept of mental illness (Wakefield 1992). Given the variable nature of 
particular mental illnesses, individuals with some mental illnesses may be open 
to shame while others, due to the nature of their illnesses, would not be. This is 
because the DSM identifies conditions that include whole-self properties over 
which individuals can exercise significant control along with conditions over 
which individuals have little to no control.  
Alzheimer's disease is a complex disorder arising largely from factors 
beyond an agent’s ability to modify and over which agents are able to exercise 
little present control. Although “being a person with Alzheimer’s disease” is a 
whole-self property, and hence could be something that a person is ashamed of, I 
argue that it is not a proper object of personal or social shaming. This is true 
even though it is understandable why some may feel shamed by the effects and 
progression of the disease. ‘Being a person with Alzheimer’s disease’ is too 
durable a property for social shaming. We may additionally argue that taking 
neurodiversity seriously should lead us to view the value of ‘being a person with 
Alzheimer’s disease’ as the subject of reasonable disagreement.10 
                                                        
10 Alexandra Perry and C.D. Herrera (2013) speak broadly on the issue of the commitment to 
pluralism embedded within the context of neurodiversity movements.  
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On the other hand, consider an individual diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder (ASPD). A person with this condition would be an apt 
candidate for shaming based on my proposed criteria. ASPD is diagnosed largely 
via reference to a person’s harmful antisocial behavior and their emotional 
character (APA 2013, 476). Both behavior and affectivity are things over which 
agents are able to exercise at least some control, they are malleable.11  
Non-moral shame and shame punishment are especially significant for 
individuals diagnosed with ASPD (and especially the subset of those with ASPD 
who are also psychopaths under the PCL-R test). This is because some have 
argued that those with ASPD may not understand moral reasons and thus are 
constitutively unable to feel guilty about what they do. Insofar as understanding 
moral wrongness is thought to license retributive punishment, this line of 
reasoning would suggest that those with ASPD cannot be held responsible for 
what they do (Levy 2007). Importantly, though individuals with ASPD may not 
be susceptible to guilt, evidence suggests that they are capable of feeling shame 
(Morrison & Gilbert 2001). 
Insofar as those with ASPD are amenable to non-moral forms of shame, 
concerns about holding these individuals responsible can be largely 
circumvented (Ramirez 2013; Ramirez forthcoming; Talbert 2008). This is a very 
real advantage of including non-moral shaming in a theory of shame. So long as a 
person can be ashamed of a noxious whole-self property, their inability to feel 
guilty about it (or to understand that what they are doing is morally wrong) does 
not excuse them from accountability. Furthermore, the motivating effects of 
shame and shame punishment can be used to enact positive behavioral 
improvement in such individuals in ways that have proven more successful than 
traditional therapeutic approaches (Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez 2014). 
Some have argued that ASPD, along with all ‘cluster-B personality disorders,’ are 
better construed as moral disorders given that they are characterized primarily 
in terms of moral failings (Charland 2007). Because ASPD is malleable and 
because ASPD is largely defined in terms of antisocial behavioral traits that make 
it difficult, if not impossible, for someone with ASPD to live peaceably with 
others, it is permissible, assuming my criteria are met, to target these individuals 
for shame and shame punishment.  
Lastly, I wish to consider the diagnosis currently described as gender 
dysphoria (GD) in the DSM (APA 2013, 451). Gender dysphoria is described as a 
persistent and pervasive dissatisfaction or unhappiness (dysphoria) caused by a 
“marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and 
primary and/or secondary sex characteristics” (APA 2013, 452). Gender 
dysphoria replaced a disorder known as ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ (GID) in the 
previous incarnations of the DSM (APA 2000, 581). Gender identity (either under 
                                                        
11 Some may have impulse control disorders that transform affectivity into an especially 
durable trait. Such individuals may be exempt from shaming on that basis.  
Erick Jose Ramirez 
92 
the GD or GID labels) should not, on my account of shame, be something about 
which individuals should be made to feel shamed about. Gender identity is a 
durable property. Additionally, social constructions of sex and gender are topics 
about which reasonable disagreement is possible. Much as with racialized shame, 
we can make sense of how individuals who internalize norms that denigrate 
their identity can come to feel a pervasive sense of shame about this whole-self 
property. The proper response, in the context of value pluralism, is to prevent 
the shaming of people over their gender identities and to encourage a shift in 
perspective so that the shamed individual comes to reject the norms that ground 
it.  
Conclusion 
Shame is a powerful reactive attitude that is often associated with the worst 
aspects of the social world. Shame is unpleasant to feel and, when recalcitrant, 
can make us doubt our own value and even our identity. It is important, for these 
reasons, that we better understand the conditions that trigger shame and how 
this emotion is related to humiliation and anger.  
I argue that it is best to think of shame and embarrassment as two faces of 
the same underlying emotion. Once better understood, I argue that shame, used 
in the right way, can be an important instrument for positive change in the 
context of pluralistic liberal societies. Provided that a society targets malleable 
and unreasonable whole-self properties, shame can be used to reintegrate 
individuals into society in ways that have been too-long neglected.  
Shame is a dangerous tool, however, when used incorrectly and caution 
must always be exercised to ensure that shame is used in reintegrative not 
disintegrative ways. Though the dangers of shame and shame punishment have 
led some to argue in favor of social prohibitions against shame, this conclusion is 
too strong. Shame, suitably, rehabilitated, can be an important aspect of social 
progress and social justice. 
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